Cash, leverage, debt, equity, and the difference between fake and real opportunity costs
/Worth doing with cash
Many years ago when I spent more time on the travel hacking circuit, I heard a guest talking about a then-current Office Depot/OfficeMax deal. She exclaimed, “it was worth doing with cash!” This made such an impression on me that it’s stuck with me through the years, and has exerted a kind of gravitational pull of commonsense that not all travel hackers are naturally endowed with, myself very much included.
Longtime readers will recall that over the course of the merger between Office Depot and OfficeMax, the stores continued to be operated independently (Madison, Wisconsin, where I lived at the time of this anecdote, had an Office Depot on one side of town and an OfficeMax on the other), but they had synchronized their weekly coupons. A common promotion at the time offered a $15 discount off the purchase of $300 in Visa or MasterCard gift cards (depending on the week).
The promotion worked at both stores, but the stores had different inventory and sales policies: OfficeMax had fixed-value gift cards that could be purchased with credit cards (like Chase Ink cards that earned 5 Ultimate Rewards points per dollar) and Office Depot had variable-value cards that could only be purchased with cash and debit cards. What this meant was that most people were stuck buying two $200 fixed-value cards with their Chase Ink cards, paying two activation fees, and earning a small profit before credit card rewards and liquidation costs.
The speaker at this gathering was making the simple point that $500 variable-value cards were worth buying without earning any credit card rewards at all: you could earn all your profit up front by buying $500 variable-value cards with cash, and not face any purchase restrictions at all; she could clear the store out, write them a check, and walk out with $1,000 in profit (after liquidation). As I recall, in this iteration of the promotion purchasing three $500 gift cards would trigger five $15 credits, for a pre-liquidation profit of $54.15 per 3-card purchase.
I still use this anecdote as a kind of quality control check when I’m exploring a new technique, or a new approach to an old technique, because it helps me break them into individual parts: which parts cost money? Which parts earn money? Is there a way to skip the parts that cost money and jump straight to the parts that earn money?
A simple example is bank account signup bonuses. Doctor of Credit curates an endless list of these bonuses, which typically let you earn a few hundred dollars for setting up a direct deposit and sometimes leaving some money in the account for a few months. Some of these banks also allow you to fund your initial bank account deposit with a credit card, usually limited to a few hundred or thousand dollars.
You can imagine someone taking these two facts and deciding “the best technique is to use my highest-earning credit card to fund accounts with banks with the highest new account bonuses that accepts credit card funding.”
In this example the error is clear: you should sign up for the highest new account bonuses regardless of whether they can be funded with credit cards. Accepting a $200 signup bonus instead of a $300 signup bonus so you can charge $500 to a credit card that only earns 2% in rewards is the purest false economy — use cash and earn the $300 instead.
Leverage
If ordinary Americans ever encounter the idea of leverage, it’s in one of two places: the purchase of a primary residence, and the gutting of the industrial and commercial giants of the 20th century. The principle is the same in both cases.
Given any amount of starting capital (including $0), you can earn an excess return on any investment through the addition of borrowed money: $100,000 spent on a $100,000 house allows you to earn the appreciation on a $100,000 house, but $100,000 spent on the down payment of a $500,000 house allows you to earn the appreciation on a $500,000 house. If you can’t make your mortgage payments, or the house craters in value, you can walk away with nothing but a stern warning on your credit report.
Likewise, in the leveraged buyout of a stodgy old industrial firm, investor groups can borrow against the assets of a company and strip it for parts. If they are able to unload the shell to some greater fool at a profit, then they’ve earned free money on the exercise. If not, they haven’t staked any of their own money on it to begin with anyway.
This is the core of the ideology of leverage: stake as little of your own fortune as possible to secure an equity interest with unlimited upside.
Against opportunity cost
Many pillars of elementary economics, which is as far as most business and finance journalists seem to make it, rely on the conceit of rational economic actors who are constantly operating at an “opportunity frontier.” That is to say, all their resources are optimally allocated across all available opportunities at all times. When a new opportunity comes along, the economic actor determines whether and how many resources to allocate to it by comparing it to all other existing opportunities.
I like to think of this as the “bump off” fallacy: each new opportunity is evaluated to see whether it should bump a lower-earning opportunity off the bottom of the stack of available opportunities.
The problem, which I have only become more aware of as I have become more experienced, is that virtually no one operates anywhere close to the opportunity frontier. This is frequently parsed by malicious people as “this generation would rather eat avocado toast than save for a down payment,” but I am making a much more literal argument: most people do not hold even their long-term cash savings in accounts that earn the maximum rate of interest available to them.
They are not guilty of anything for not maximizing their rate of return. There are only so many hours in the day, and too many people spend too many of them between working and getting back and forth from work. You would be insane to blame them for preferring dinner, a beer, and a football game than moving money back and forth between high-interest checking accounts.
The flip side of that is that “opportunity cost” is an absurd way to describe the choices of someone who is not operating anywhere close to the opportunity frontier.
You only get to keep the difference
There is a commonsense logic behind the concept of opportunity cost, however, which I use when making decisions about using cash or debt for any given opportunity: you only get to keep the difference.
That is to say, if an opportunity comes along that lets you earn (pulling a number out of thin air) 19.6% APY (1.5% per month annualized), and you choose to finance that opportunity with cash that’s currently earning 5.01% APY, then you shouldn’t take credit for the full 19.6% you see in returns, but only the difference between that and the return you would have earned on your status quo ante, a “mere” 14.59%.
Obviously I’m being a bit facetious: that would be an excellent thing to do with your cash savings, if you had to. But if you didn’t have to, and you could keep the whole whack, you’d be even better off.
Administered interest rates on credit card debt make a lot of things worth doing with debt
Back in November I described my distinction between “administered” and “market” interest rates. Credit cards offer a curious combination of the two: an administered interest rate of 0% on loans of between 15 and 50 days (depending on when the purchase falls in the statement cycle and the length of your grace period), and a (high) market interest rate on loans after each statement’s grace period has expired. A credit card earning 2% in cashback rewards offers even more favorable terms, the equivalent of a 2% yield, rather than interest charge, on each new loan you originate each month, as long as you pay it back in time.
Let me illustrate this with an example present at this very moment in the real world. The Giant grocery store chain is currently offering 2 or 3 points per dollar on the purchase of Vanilla Visa prepaid debit cards. Their variable-value cards still cost $6.95 (while Safeway’s cards have gone up to $7.95 in my region), so each purchase yields a profit of $3.05 or $8.05 in grocery rewards ($10 or $15 in grocery rewards less a $6.95 activation fee), minus any liquidation cost. This is a classic “worth doing in cash” situation: the profit is present however you pay for the gift card that generates it.
But remember, you only get to keep the difference. If you did pay with a debit card linked to an account earning 5% APY and it took 5 days to liquidate the gift card back into your balance, how much did it cost you? About $0.33 in interest, bringing your final profit down by the same amount.
In this situation, the rationale for using a credit card is obvious regardless of any rewards earned: why sacrifice the interest earned on your cash when you have access to a costless source of credit?
Inverting the logic of leverage
The common examples of leverage I offered, residential home purchases and corporate buyouts, have in common the basic conceit that acquiring ownership of a productive asset with borrowed money lets you secure a larger future income stream than you would be able to afford with your cash on hand, while enjoying an unlimited upside and capped downside.
What I am telling you is that these opportunities do not only exist at the tail end of the duration curve, the 30-year mortgage or the 10-year airline turnaround or the 5-year electric car plant retooling. The precise same logic applies at very shortest durations, where administered interest rates make debt free or profitable to take on.
When and where that is the case, using capital rather than debt to pursue the same opportunities puts a drag, rather than a tailwind, on your total investment return.